Since Low-cost RFID tags have very limited hardware resources, it is difficult to implement an authentication protocol which uses heavy operations such as modern ciphers or hash functions. It has been presented some ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags by using very light operations. Recently, Jeon and Yoon proposed a new ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol. They defined and used the merge and separation operations. The merge operation can merge the bits from two bit strings and the separation operation is an inverse operation of the merge operation. However, we found that the protocol cannot serve correctly when the collision of tag pseudonyms is occurred. In this paper, we propose an improved authentication protocol that solves the problem. We show that the proposed protocol can resist various security attacks and is efficient enough to implement low-cost RFID tags.
Introduction
The RFID systems are very useful and convenient in various applications. Therefore, they are widely used such as access control, supply chain management, inventory control, smart labels, and etc. The usage of application is significantly increasing. Generally, RFID systems are consisted of three entities: tags, the reader, and the server. The reader is connected to the server which has a database.
The communications between the reader and the server are safe enough from the various security attacks. However, since the communications between the reader and the tags are performed through wireless channel, they are vulnerable to the security attacks. Therefore, in order to resist the security attacks between the reader and the tags, authentication protocols are generally used.
Since low-cost RFID tags have very limited hardware resources, it is difficult for them to adapt the existing authentication protocols using modern ciphers which require a lot of computation cost and storage space. Thus, several ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags have been proposed recently. These protocols generally use some lightweight operations such as XOR, rotation, AND, OR, permutation, etc. In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al.
proposed a family of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for low-cost RFID, LMAP [1] and M 2 AP [2] , which use bitwise operations, XOR, AND, OR, and modular operation. Since their protocols were very simple, they were suitable for low-lost RFID tags. Unfortunately, their protocols are vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and full disclose attack [3] . In 2007, Chien [4] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol, SASI, which supports mutual authentication and tag anonymity. However, Sun et el. [5] showed that SASI cannot resist from the de-synchronization attack. Cao et al. [6] showed that SASI is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack through the man-in-the-middle attack. Phan [7] used the imbalance of the bitwise OR operation to do the tracking attack for SASI. In 2009, Peris-Lopez et al. [8] proposed another ultra-lightweight authentication protocol called Gossamer. But in 2010, Targa et al. [9] showed that Gossamer is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack. In 2011, Tian et al. [10] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol (RAPP) for low-cost RFID tags. They defined and used permutation operation in their protocol.
However, quite recently, Jeon and Yoon [11] proposed a new authentication protocol, EURFID for low-cost RFID tags. In their protocol, they defined and used the merge and separation operations. The merge operation can merge the bits from two bit strings and the separation operation is an inverse operation of the merge operation. However, we found that the EURFID protocol does not operate correctly when the collision of tag pseudonyms is occurred between one tag and the other tags.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section 2, we describe preliminaries and notations for this paper and comment the security problem of the EURFID protocol and then describe the proposed RAPLT protocol in section 3. In section 4, the security and efficiency analysis of the proposed scheme are discussed. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 5.
Preliminaries and Notations
RFID systems are composed of three entities: the tags, the reader, and the back-end server containing the database. The communication channel between the reader and the back-end server is generally assumed secure, but the communication channel between the reader and the tags is wireless and insecure.
For the sake of convenience, we assume that the reader has the database. So we use two entities, the reader and the tags in the protocols. Each tag and the server share the unique identity of the tag, secret keys, and old and new pseudonyms of the tag to resist de-synchronization attacks. Jeon and Yoon [11] defined the merge operation, Mer() and the separation operation, Sep() and used them in their protocol, RAPLT. The Mer() and Sep() are the relation of inverse operation. To describe this paper easily, we use some notations and summarized them in Table   1 [11]. 
Mer(A, B, K, C)
Merge operation which merges A and B to C according to K. If the bit of K is 0, then the bit of A moved to C, otherwise the bit of B moved to C.
Sep(C, K, A, B)
Separation operation which demerges C to A and B according to K. If the bit of K is 0, then the bit of C moved to A, otherwise the bit of B moved to C. ⨁ Bit wise XOR operator ∥ String concatenation operator → Message transmission
The proposed RAPLT protocol
This section proposes an improved RFID authentication protocol which solves the flaw that exists in the EURFID protocol [11] . In the EURFID protocol, there is no collision policy for the tag's pseudonyms. Tag's pseudonym, IDS is updated each successful session, but the protocol does not check if the IDS is unique or not in the server's database. If a tag's IDS is equal to other tag's IDS, the tag can be considered as the other tag on the reader's side. Therefore, in that case, the tag cannot be authenticated.
In order to solve the flaw in the EURFID protocol, it requires a mechanism that the protocol guarantees every new IDS is unique. As a solution mechanism, we use one of the random numbers. If the server generates a random number which can be a unique IDS in the database and uses it as a new IDS, such mechanism can overcome the problem existing in the EURFID protocol. Therefore, we propose a modified EURFID to eliminate the collision problem. 
where a total count of 0 = total count of 1=l.
Mer(A,B,K,C) operation is as follows.
i,j ← 1
end if end for Sep(C,K,A,B) operation is as follows.
end if end for Fig. 1 shows an example that illustrates the movement of bits when Mer() and Sep() operations are executed.
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Fig. 1 Execution example of Mer() and Sep() operations
The detail procedure of the proposed protocol, RAPLT is described below and summarized it in Fig. 2 .
Step 1: The reader sends a "Hello" message to the tag to initiate a session.
Step 2: If the "Hello" message is received a second time, the tag sends IDS as ‫ܵܦܫ‬ , otherwise the tag sends IDS as ‫ܵܦܫ‬ to the reader.
Step 3: The reader searches the IDS in the back-end database. If IDS does not exist in the database, the reader sends "Hello" message again, otherwise the reader obtains ‫ܭ‬ ଵ , ‫ܭ‬ ଶ , and ‫ܦܫ‬ of the matched IDS from the database. The reader generates two l-bit random numbers, ݊ ଵ which can be a unique IDS in the database and ݊ ଶ . Then the reader computes
Finally the reader sends the message, ሺ‫ܣ‬ ଵ , ‫ܣ‬ ଶ , ‫ܤ‬ ଷ ሻ, to the tag.
Step 4: The tag extracts
If ‫ܤ‬ ଷ does not equal to ‫ܤ‬ ଷ ᇱ , the tag does not authenticate the reader and terminates the protocol run. Otherwise the tag authenticates the reader and executes
Then the tag sends the message, ሺ‫ܥ‬ ଷ ሻ, to the reader. Finally the tag updates ‫ܵܦܫ‬ as IDS, and ‫ܵܦܫ‬ as ݊ ଵ .
Step 5: The reader computes ‫ܥ‬ ଷ ᇱ by executing of
If ‫ܥ‬ ଷ does not equal to ‫ܥ‬ ଷ ᇱ , the reader does not authenticate the tag and terminates the protocol run. Otherwise the reader authenticates the tag and updates ‫ܵܦܫ‬ as IDS, and ‫ܵܦܫ‬ as ݊ ଵ .
New ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol
4 Security and Efficiency Analysis
This section analyzed the security and privacy of the proposed RAPLT protocol.
The basic structure of the proposed protocol is similar to that of EURFID except that it solves the collision problem of the EURFID protocol. Jeon and Yoon [11] showed that EURFID protocol has resistances to several security attacks and protects the privacy of users. 
RFID Reader
If Hello is received a second time then ‫ܵܦܫ‬ ൌ ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ else ‫ܵܦܫ‬ ൌ ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ ; Fig. 2 The proposed RAPLT protocol
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In their paper, EURFID protocol has resistance to the brute-force attack, the replay attack, the de-synchronization attack, and the disclosure attack. It also has tag anonymity and resistance to the tracking of tag. Therefore, the proposed protocol, RAPLT as well as EURFID can resist the various security attacks and has no collision problem of IDS.
The performance of EURFID is evaluated in terms of security, computation operation, storage requirement, and communication cost in each tag. We assume that the hardware and software power of the reader and the server are good enough to run the protocol. So we analyzed only the performance of the tag and summarized it in Table 2 with some other ultra-lightweight authentication protocols.
In Table 2 , L denotes the length of each item stored in the tags. As we can see in Table 2 , all the protocols except RAPLT do not support the IDS collision resistance. Therefore, we can state that RAPLT has the most powerful security among them.
In RAPLT, the operations used in the tags are efficient enough to be performed in low-cost tags. Even though the communication cost of RAPLT for each tag is 3L, it becomes the worst case only when de-synchronization attack occurs.
Therefore, we can say that actual communication cost of RAPLT is 2L.
The communication cost of SASI and improved RAPP is also 2L, but they cannot resist the de-synchronization attack. RAPLT requires 5L storage space in the tag, which is less than or equal to those of other protocols. 
